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ABSTRACT
This essay develops aspects and implications of Poteat’s critique of the 
Enlightenment’s critical paradigm and development of post-critical 
thinking in dialogue with Pascal in his dissertation and four post-critical 
thinkers who figured prominently in his project: Kierkegaard, Merleau-
Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Polanyi. Then it critiques from a Poteatian 
perspective the critical, dualistic, discarnate picture that still dominates 
the academy, especially attending to the cognitive science of religion. 
CSR involves both a reductive physicalism involving unconscious mental 
mechanisms and a re-inscribing of subjectivistic or mentalist (alleged) 
beliefs in disembodied supernatural and human spirits.
This article will analyze the project of William H. Poteat’s career, especially as 
focused on the themes of embodiment and of the dualistic, discarnate Enlightenment 
“picture” of human nature and of reality that he found troubling and ultimately insane. 
This insanity results in the loss of conviction that life is worth living, as modernity’s 
controlling picture yields a subjectivism or mentalism—either absolutistic or relativis-
tic—that sunders us from our bodies and our embodiment in the world or a physicalism 
leaving no place for the meaning or the sacredness of human and animal life. Focusing 
on several key themes/ideas/metaphors, it will make reference to his 1950 dissertation 
and to the ideas of four post-critical thinkers who figured prominently in Poteat’s teach-
ing and scholarship. Graduate students in Religious Studies during my time there from 
Tradition & Discovery: The Journal of the Polanyi Society 44:1
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1977 through 1981 referred to the following as Poteat’s “canonical” thinkers, as Poteat 
rotated four courses on these four: theologian Soren Kierkegaard, phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein, and philoso-
pher of science and epistemology Michael Polanyi. I do want to emphasize that Poteat 
taught courses to other cohorts of his students on, and seriously engaged with, other 
post-critical thinkers. This piece will conclude with an application of Poteat’s concerns 
to the so-called “cognitive science of religion,” which has gained much currency in 
recent years.
Before delving into the four post-critical thinkers, I will attempt to unpack some of 
the various but inter-related meanings of being “critical” in the Cartesian Enlightenment 
sense and by way of contrast of being “post-critical.” Descartes famously split the world 
into two radically, fundamentally different realities, thinking substances and extended 
substances. This dualism worked to discarnate human beings whichever pole one 
focused upon: 1) an internal pure mind unable to find any meaning in the world even 
as it pictured a god-like external and impersonal vision of things, or 2) a merely physi-
cal, spatial, externalized, objectified, de-personalized, machine-like body devoid of any 
meaning. Thus one absconds or absents oneself from one’s actual minded embodiment 
in the world. Either pole discarnates one from one’s living body that enacts and discov-
ers meaning in the world. The specifically critical component of Descartes’ picture 
centers on the demand for certainty. For any belief to count as knowledge it needs to 
find explicit justification according to formal, reversible logic expressed in clear and 
distinct ideas. Indeed, one had an obligation to exert one’s utmost effort to doubt 
before believing anything. Relying acritically on any presumed knowledge was anath-
ema. Given the split between mind on the one hand and body-world on the other and 
the demand for indubitable knowledge, finding truth and value—finding any mean-
ing—becomes impossible. Plying the mind side of the divide, absolutistic beliefs about 
oneself or one’s group cannot legitimately withstand such scrutiny; plying the physical 
side, the critical gaze turns one into a robot. Nihilism results when one unflinchingly 
approaches the world through this Cartesian picture. To the extent one allows this 
picture to influence one’s day-to-day living, insanity will be the result.
In his essay, “Being Post-Critical,” Dale Cannon notes several aspects of the term 
“post-critical,” including its opposition to the Enlightenment program.1 In being post-
critical one rejects the Cartesian demand for explicit certainty. This rejection involves 
a paradigm shift that I will proceed to explicate. The post-critical paradigm refuses the 
Cartesian program of systematic doubt, where any and all truth and meaning must find 
explicit justification, must stand up to critical reflection. Instead, one recognizes that 
one always relies tacitly on knowledge not critically established, including one’s body, 
language(s), and traditions. I would note here that one’s language and traditions are not 
separate from one’s embodiment in the world, but function as aspects of that embodi-
ment. Indeed, the post-critical paradigm asserts that there are some things upon which 
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we must primordially rely acritically (and thus tacitly or prereflectively) in order to 
know anything at all. The fiduciary dimension of acknowledgement and embracing 
of our acritical reliance on our embodiment in the world for most of our knowledge 
then is crucial for being post-critical. This entails a personal commitment that one is 
grounded through one’s embodiment in a real world, a common world. Thus, one’s 
attempts to know bear a universal intent. Cannon also recognizes, however, as do I, 
the need to be “critical” when appropriate. Often, being critical happens prereflectively 
as we attempt to make sense of something that appears incoherent.2 Sometimes being 
critical involves reflective reasoning in the attempt to achieve coherence. Clearly and 
most specifically for this piece, it is critical reflection within a post-critical stance that 
recognizes the critical paradigm, its genesis, and its dire consequences. In the follow-
ing I will develop aspects and implications of Poteat’s critique of the Enlightenment’s 
critical paradigm and development of post-critical thinking in dialogue with Pascal and 
the four post-critical thinkers and then in relation to the cognitive science of religion.
In “Pascal’s Conception of Man and Modern Sensibility,” Poteat expounds upon 
some Cartesian Enlightenment conceits that would drive his future scholarly endeav-
ors. In homing in on Descartes as the “fulfillment”3 of Renaissance and Enlightenment 
conceptions of reality and human nature, Poteat emphasizes the “exteriorization of 
sensibility,” whereby all is reduced to mathematical abstractions of space and time.4 
Here humanity has achieved autonomy with respect to God, yet the upshot of this high 
accomplishment is merely that humanity can exercise technical reason to purportedly 
control a machine-like universe.5 Humanity has become an external object to itself, 
with mind losing any inherent meaning as it attempts to control a mechanistic nature 
whose only possible meaning might have resulted from the projection of meaning upon 
it by mind.6 Poteat’s assessment of the effect of Enlightenment assumptions on its 
understanding of human nature accords with his reliance upon Pascal as his principal 
interlocutor. Poteat begins Chapter 1 with a telling quotation from Pascal: “The eternal 
silence of these infinite spaces frightens me.”7 Pascal presciently anticipated the ulti-
mate issue of the Cartesian paradigm of mathematical and physical space in relativism 
and nihilism.
The motif of the loss of the human self continues in one of the four post-critical 
thinkers, Kierkegaard. I confess that Poteat on Kierkegaard was the only “canonical” 
course of my years at Duke that I did not have opportunity to take. To my knowledge, 
Kierkegaard did not explicitly deal with the issue of (dis)embodiment. However, an 
important connection between the Pascal of the dissertation and Kierkegaard has rami-
fications for the embodied nature of life: the centrality of time and decision for the 
existential self. As Poteat notes in the dissertation, Descartes reduces “time to a mode 
for measuring motion in space…obscuring” that time in “creaturely existence” is “irre-
versible and decisive.”8 Kierkegaard, reacting against abstract conceptions where time 
is under our control, writes of the aesthete who can contemplate infinite possibilities 
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without ever having to decide. Although Poteat in Polanyian Meditations specifically 
refers to Kierkegaard less than to any of the other “canonicals,” temporality figures heav-
ily in his expounding upon our embodied existence. His analysis of a musical melody 
in particular and of the temporal nature of existence more generally, with his frequent 
deployment of “pretension” with respect to stretching to the future and “retrotension” 
with respect to stretching from the past, constitute a quintessential component of this 
effort. 
Temporality also figures prominently in another crucial Poteatian theme, the 
contrast between the Greek proclivity to engage the world through vision versus the 
Hebrew tendency to do so through orality/aurality. Vision tempts us to imagine that 
we can cognize reality in a timeless instant, while the written text obscures the reality of 
time, because we can view a whole page or more at once, because of its physical fixity 
and permanence, and because of its transportability across time and place. Orality/
aurality, on the other hand, entails personal engagement and responsibility in a particu-
lar context, a particular space and a particular passage of time. Thus a focus on vision 
allows for a discarnate and insane picture of human nature and reality in a way that 
orality does not, an idea that I will expand upon next.
From the first time Poteat in a class session shared with me and others Renaissance 
paintings where everything is crystal clear in foreground and background,9 I was struck 
with the pregnancy of his observation. The picture of human nature these paintings 
convey clearly involves God-like (transcendent) cognitive powers, where all is fully 
known immediately—at least this becomes obvious as Poteat interprets its significance. 
This picture disembodies and abstracts us from our bodies and our convivial natu-
ral and social worlds. The desire to know all with certainty and without mediation 
becomes philosophically explicit in Descartes. Moreover, Poteat notes in his books how 
this standard for truth and reality, where the fullness of Being must be immediately 
present without any alleged slippage of time, continues to haunt deconstructionists 
and poststructuralists like Derrida and de Man. Thus, for them the sign never really 
signifies and meaning remains ever undecidable—except for the arbitrary decisions we 
cannot help but make. Poteat pinpoints the standard of truth and reality that haunts 
them: 
When, however, under the blows of philosophic criticism, ahistori-
cal Truth is exposed as a chimera and we are left, so we suppose, 
with “only” the realities that are disclosed amid the pretentions and 
retrotensions of time—when, in short, we are left “only” with history, 
by definition devoid of an ahistorical truth—the perfectly ordinary 
relativism that can be overcome in practice, now viewed through the 
afterimage of the doctrine of an ahistorical Truth and therein show-
ing itself destitute of any mark of truth of this kind, becomes the 
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relativism, so heavy with pathos, that for us henceforth attests to the 
absence of all truth.10
I recently discovered Poteat’s intriguing lecture, “The Banality of Evil: The Darkness 
at the Center.”11 Here Poteat references Hannah Arendt’s notion of banality, by which 
she does not intend to deny the seriousness of the evil behind the Holocaust but rather 
to indicate the commonplace nature of the evil of many perpetrators through a lack 
of empathy and/or conformity. In this lecture and in Recovering the Ground, which has 
many references to Kierkegaard, Poteat ruminates further about the modern loss of self 
and its possible recovery.12 In the lecture, he begins with Enlightenment pretensions 
(in the everyday sense) to transcendent God-like perfection, where humans can see 
everything with an absolute clarity that enables us to subject everything to mechanistic 
and bureaucratic scientific rationality. However, following this line of thought we inevi-
tably end up becoming part of the machine and the bureaucracy—the type of problem 
Poteat identified in his dissertation. Thus we succumb to the banality of evil, which 
results in losing ourselves in the finite, in refusing spirit, in refusing transcendence, 
which results paradigmatically in the Holocaust. While the objectivist, materialistic, 
relativistic, and nihilistic sides of modern disembodiment may have the upper hand 
in how we humans picture ourselves and explain why many Germans cooperated with 
the Final Solution, we can also find in Poteat’s thought the continuing influence of an 
other side, as he takes notice of the Gnosticism of fascism and communism: that is, the 
absolutistic, idealistic, transcendent aspects of the modern picture.13 Paul Tillich, who 
lived for a while under Nazi rule before escaping to America, explains the attraction of 
fascism to European youth: alienated by “the emptiness of adjustment to the demands 
of the industrial society” and “the emptiness” of “playing with cultural goods,” they 
longed for “something absolutely serious” (even if demonic).14 In separating themselves 
from Jews and other undesirables, it’s probably no coincidence that the Nazis harped 
upon the alleged disgusting physical bodies of these others. Additionally, participat-
ing in the projected glories of the Third Reich—as the ultimate consummation of 
history—served as a means to transcend death, even as the barbarity and insanity of 
mass death reigned. 
Poteat’s and Kierkegaard’s recipes for recovering the human self are similar: claim-
ing my givenness, my embodiment, as a self in community, as received from a divine 
source, in such a way that I take responsibility for who I am, what I say, what I do. 
That constitutes accepting oneself as spirit before the Spirit, as achieving the tran-
scendence possible and appropriate for a finite human being, rather than the insanity 
of a supposed absolutistic transcendence of mind or of the non-transcendence of the 
human as a meaningless material object.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is the post-critical thinker who most explicitly identi-
fies and problematizes the dualism inherent in the Enlightenment discarnate picture, 
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as the dichotomous pair of idealism or subjectivism and empiricism or objectivism 
form two sides of the same Cartesian coin. In splitting us from our lived world and 
from ourselves, that picture assumes an either-or between a disembodied mind that 
finds meaning in abstract conceptions and mental images on the one side or material 
objects, including our own bodies, whose only possible meaning is merely physical 
or physiological, on the other. In either case, internally or externally, reality is already 
determinate, rather than becoming determinate in the mostly prereflective bodily 
engagement with the thing. The sense of Poteat’s distinctive coinage of “mindbody” 
accords with the meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s “phenomenal” (1962:105-106), expe-
riential, habit, or lived body. The root for our living, being, knowing is the on-going 
correlation of our attentive, embodied effort to make sense of the things, the world, 
which call us into a mutually constitutive relationship. In Poteat’s words: 
My mindbody as imagination—as, that is, the pretension toward 
order, meaning, coherence, closure, logos—devises, that is, defines 
and arrests, an articulation within the hitherto indeterminate... 
In time and through habituation, what Merleau-Ponty calls sedimen-
tation, these and untold others become usages: what and the way in 
which we do and say; what and the way in which we are given to 
doing and saying; the repertoire of instruments and gestures that are 
their means—words and concepts, by what they exclude and what 
they include, establish one existential environment rather than some 
other...
Our mindbodies as imagination in its pretension towards meaning 
and coherence shapes and articulates the world and ourselves in it.15
To the extent we can (re)claim our mindbody or phenomenal body engaged in 
our natural and social world we can avoid the insanity of a mind sundered from its 
meaningful world or of a meaningless world of reductively physical objects, including 
our own embodied selves.
Ludwig Wittgenstein obviously focuses on language. He does not explicitly dwell 
upon embodiment or disembodiment. However, he does sometimes refer to the biolog-
ical underpinnings of language and always roots language in common practices. Poteat 
recognizes that, for Wittgenstein, language use or any “language game” is always and 
necessarily embedded, ensconced, embodied in forms of life. So Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy supports that language arises from our bodies, stems from our embodiment, not 
merely instrumentally but substantively. But Poteat makes that truth explicit. Here 
follows my favorite quotation from Poteat on language:
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For I claim that language—our first formal system—has the sinews 
of our bodies, which had them first; that the grammar, the syntax, 
the ingenuous choreography of our rhetorical engagement with the 
world, the meaning, the semantic and metaphorical intentionality 
of our language are preformed in that of our prelingual mindbodily 
being in the world, which is their condition of possibility.16
At one point, Poteat notes that prior to the Enlightenment reading typically 
involved moving one’s lips, if not actually pronouncing words out loud. Enlightenment 
sensibility, regarding language as strictly mental, looks down upon such benightedness. 
Poteat, though, realizes that the bodily medium of language cannot be neatly and abso-
lutely separated from its message: “We cannot take possession of words by our ‘pure’ 
intellect, since, quite simply, there is no such thing. We apprehend them through our 
integral mindbodies; and ‘moving our lips as we read’ is a mark of this fact. Why would 
this ever happen, if it were not a condition of the comprehension of a text?”17 Here 
lines between medium and message, instrument and substance, blur. Neuroscientist, 
Antonio Damasio, author of the popular trade book Descartes’ Error, supports the 
bodily roots of all linguistic—and other—meaning, insisting that all human signs and 
symbols must involve some connection with bodily sensorimotor or feeling imagery 
to be comprehensible, to come into existence in the first place: “both words and arbi-
trary symbols are based on topographically organized representations and can become 
images.” That is, such representations involve the correlation of our body with our 
environment as appropriately mapped in our brains. Moreover, Damasio continues, 
if our words “did not become images, however fleetingly, they would not be anything 
we could know.”18 Poteat recognized that, even when we read silently keeping our lips 
still, words on a page would mean nothing if we did not tacitly cognize their oral/aural 
bodily provenance.
Wittgenstein critiques the misuse of language by philosophers captured by the 
Enlightenment picture of atemporal language realism, where a uniform system of 
supposedly arbitrary internal signs possesses a simple one-to-one correspondence to 
independent external realities. Such philosophers fail to use common sense, fail to 
observe how people actually speak and listen. Instead, he notes the embeddedness of 
language use in particular contexts of meaning, within a plentitude of language games 
and within multiple forms of life. Rather than conforming to absolute, static catego-
ries, similar words and things bear “family resemblances.” Wittgenstein’s “dissolving” 
of miscast philosophical problems definitely bears relevance to Poteat’s hope to cure 
the insanity of modernity, particularly in terms of doubting the meaningfulness of our 
lives. 
In turning to Michael Polanyi, we invoke the only post-critical thinker with whom 
Poteat engaged face to face, body to body, as well as the one who arguably influenced 
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him the most. Of Poteat’s books of which he is the sole author, Polanyian Meditations: 
In Search of a Post-Critical Logic, constitutes Poteat’s first and longest book. While 
Polanyi does not often write of embodiment, he leaves no doubt that the inalienable 
root of our tacit knowing, of what we attend from as we attend to, is precisely our 
bodies. We tacitly rely upon our bodies for all practical and intellectual knowledge. He 
writes that “when we make a thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we 
incorporate it into our body—or extend our body to include it—so that we come to 
dwell in it.”19 Here, like Merleau-Ponty, Polanyi recognizes that what constitutes inside 
and outside one’s body always depends upon the context of our knowing, of that upon 
which we acritically rely. For Polanyi this tacit grounding of all articulate knowledge 
in our inarticulate powers of engaging the world in company with our fellow human 
beings precludes any dualism between the subjective and objective. Our knowing 
always engages both our personal commitment and, despite its fallibility, a universal 
intent. The centrality of the tacit for Poteat led some of us graduate students to coin the 
phrase, “tacit attack,” where in focusing on normally tacit subsidiary elements we lose 
the ability to do something we normally do quite easily and quite well, momentarily 
failing to appropriately rely upon our bodies. And we might occasionally act out a tacit 
attack as we devolved into stumblebums in our walking.
For Poteat the post-critical paradigm calls for our grounding in something prior 
to and beyond critical, skeptical reflection. He metaphorically employs ground and 
place to point to that which is primordial. For example, from A Philosophical Daybook: 
“My mindbody is the absolutely radical and prior—at the root of and antecedent to 
absolutely everything (!)—here and now: the primordial place; whence all times and 
places are pretended; that every time and space retrotends. There being this place is 
not the condition of my mindbodily integrity; it is this integrity.”20 And in Recovering 
the Ground Poteat identifies “the unimpeachable ground of Being in which we are 
grounded” with “our lively convivial mindbodies in the world.”21 This prereflective 
ground of all meaning, this thick temporal engagement of our sentient, feeling, motile 
bodies with our social and natural world, forms the basis for all reflection and ratio-
nality, for all judgment of what is real, what is valuable. Thus inheres the insanity of 
allowing a discarnate, visual, atemporal, abstract, alienated picture of human nature to 
set the explicit or implicit standards for the real, the true, the good.22
Note that a crucial part of Poteat’s post-critical paradigm is that meaning—and 
here I am including both making sense and affording value—is primordial with our 
convivial mindbodily engagement with the world. We begin and live our lives embed-
ded, ensconced, embodied in meaning. Meaning in the first place is part and parcel of 
our embodiment in our natural and social world; critical reflection helps us make sense 
and determine value when certain problems arise. But critical reflection in the mode 
of Descartes or Derrida is helpless in establishing from scratch, from nowhere, out of 
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nothing, that something or anything has value. Traditions constitute a key element 
of the social world in which we are embodied. As Poteat argues, tradition and critical 
thought do not stand on the same logical plane; we cannot criticize our traditions whole 
cloth. He continues: “If tradition as that which is handed over, given—whether as one’s 
native language, a practice, inherited analogies, metaphors, imaginative pictures—
exerts its force on us in such a way as hardly to be felt by us, though not less potent on 
this account, it is that within which we dwell at ease.”23 Our prereflective mindbodily 
being in the world, including our social traditions, always then grounds us in meaning.
This recovery of meaning, of the ground, of common sense, and of a genuine 
human self, suggests another Poteatian theme: that we are at home in the world; or at 
least we can be if we overcome a discarnate picture of human nature and the nature 
of the world. This at-home-ness contrasts with a Cartesian world where thinking and 
extended realities never cohere, a Heideggerian/Sartrean world into which we are indif-
ferently thrown, or a Derridian/Foucaultian world where we can never be present nor 
mean what we say. As Poteat pens, 
We are at home in the world insofar as we dwell in our lively mindbod-
ies in the matrices of our form of life. To suffer from bad conscience 
because of this—as is the Enlightenment’s way—to, alternatively, 
talk in Heideggerian terms of our being “thrown” into the world 
does not alter the fact of our having been “handed over” to ourselves 
precisely by that which has formed and continues to sustain us. It 
serves only to fashion an Enlightenment myth in the light of which 
we are declared to be homeless. And so we have taken ourselves since 
Descartes handed us our deracinate cogito.24
Thus for Poteat we are radically grounded in meaning as responsible persons 
through our mindbodily engagement with our social and natural world in its temporal 
thickness and in its tacit and fiduciary prereflectivity, which includes language, tradi-
tions, and forms of life, as the very basis for reflection and critical thinking.
Dale Cannon has raised the question: “When speaking of an ‘existential recovery 
of oneself,’ ‘a return to the ground,’ ‘a post-critical paradigm shift,’ and ‘a recovery 
of commonsense,’ was [Poteat] talking about the same thing or different things?”25 I 
submit that all these phrases represent inter-related angles of a very coherent project; 
all these began as or became ways of speaking about overcoming an insane dualistic, 
disembodied picture of humanity in relation to the world. 
However, by and large the academy and our culture have uncritically accepted the 
critical picture—a picture that attempts to subject everything to its discarnate, criti-
cal gaze. Therefore, it will take serious efforts by many in the way of critical reflection 
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in the post-critical mode—in touch with our radical embodiment—and widespread 
dissemination of that reflection to dissolve that picture and cure our insanity.
What then are the prospects of overcoming this insane picture in the academy and 
beyond? I confess that I am more pessimistic than in my younger days. As Cannon 
notes, becoming post-critical involves a personal transformation and a heuristic leap, 
shifts that are impossible existentially and logically as long as one views the world 
through the Enlightenment picture.26 The absurdity of that picture when it becomes 
focal rather than tacit and the ubiquity of the “postmodern” contributed to my earlier 
optimism. Of course, deconstructive and poststructuralist forms of postmodernism 
won the branding wars for the term, rather than a more moderate or common sense 
postmodernism. While deconstructionism/poststructuralism has passed its heyday, 
various forms of constructivism that deny meaning inherent in our embodiment 
still hold sway in much of the humanities and social sciences. I have found that the 
American Academy of Religion’s Body and Religion Group seems to be just about how 
the body is constructed, rather than how one’s body in the first instance constructs. 
Such constructivism takes the subjective or mentalist or “idealistic” side of dualism, 
to use Merleau-Ponty’s terminology. The subjective side also takes other forms. In the 
earlier-mentioned lecture, “The Banality of Evil,” Poteat notes Descartes’ rhapsodiz-
ing about human transcendence, “even to the point of perhaps one day overcoming 
death.” Poteat goes on to clarify, “I’m not making this up. These were his very words.” 
Yet today, some scientists look forward to preventing the aging and the regeneration 
of cells such that we might indefinitely postpone death. Furthermore, some futurists, 
Ray Kurzweil having garnered the most fame, foresee a time when human conscious-
ness as information will be uploaded to a great computer, thereby totally eliminating 
the human body in our ultimate consummation. What insanity to imagine we will 
continue to exist as immortal bodiless information!
Many natural scientists and other academics adhere to the objectivist or “empiri-
cal” side in the form of a reductive physicalism, which in its own way alienates and 
disembodies us from our lived body and its inherent meaningfulness. The influence of 
this reductive physicalist picture extends beyond the academy, as non-academics some-
times wonder, “Am I just the synapses of my brain?” or “Am I just my (selfish) genes?”
And then there is the so-called cognitive science of religion.27 On the one hand, 
cognitive scientists of religion generally assume a reductive physicalism as their own 
metaphysical or ontological stance. As indicated earlier, from a Poteatian perspective, 
this simply opts for one side of Cartesian dualism. Meaning and value pertain to the 
subjective side of the divide, making them unreal, illusory for the physicalist. So we are 
left with meaningless physical processes, thus alienating ourselves from our personal 
meaning-laden embodiment in the world. An example of such a process is postulated 
in unconscious mental mechanisms that are supposed to cause humans to detect super-
natural agency when none exists. Undoubtedly in immediate processing of stimuli 
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from our environment, we do have a prudent tendency to suppose agency. Better a 
false alarm when there’s a rustle in the bush than to ignore a dangerous predator. But 
CSR utilizes this truth to oversimplify things. Something I learned from Poteat is that 
our attempts to orient ourselves in more abstract realms have some continuity with our 
most primordial attempts to orient ourselves in our environment. This desire involves 
a concern for truth, accuracy, and coherence. We breathe a sigh of relief when the rustle 
isn’t a tiger. Our concern for truth involves both our prereflective and more reflective 
efforts. CSR presumes that human reflection regarding possible extraordinary, super-
natural, or ultimate causes must always be overridden, overwhelmed by prereflective 
mechanisms. Lost is a responsible person or self who can be appropriately prereflective 
and appropriately critical. Most of us accordingly are supposedly powerless to over-
come unconscious mechanisms that render futile our universal intent to discover truth 
and meaning.
Cognitive scientists of religion find an avenue of support for their position in 
the supposed proclivity of young children to believe in supernatural agents. Deborah 
Kelemen has concluded that children probably are natural teleologists and even intu-
itive theists, because they theorize that inanimate natural objects have an intended 
purpose.28 Olivera Petrovich goes further in holding that young children possess innate 
“core religious concepts,” since they overwhelmingly answer that plants and animals 
have been created by God.29 Of course, the fly in their ointment is that young children 
have encountered the concept of God from adults. No evidence exists that young chil-
dren have on their own, de novo, invented the idea of a powerful supernatural agent. 
Indeed, one study purports to show that young children do not invoke animistic or 
magical thinking to explain natural events.30 Moreover, at least two studies cast doubt 
on how much of a tendency children have to teleologize or ascribe intentionality to 
phenomena: a 1932 study of tribal children by Margaret Mead and one by contem-
porary psychologist Frank C. Keil.31 Mead concludes that Manus children, despite 
growing up in a very animistic culture, “not only show no tendency towards sponta-
neous animistic thought, but that they also show what may perhaps legitimately be 
termed a negativism towards explanations couched in animistic rather than practical 
cause and effect terms.”32 As part of a series of experiments on categorizing life forms 
with children in grades kindergarten, 2, and 4, Keil described and asked questions 
about a “thing” that could enter a human body and cause harm. Subgroups were given 
alternative descriptions of this “thing”: 1) functional or teleological where the thing 
has to get inside people’s bodies and use parts of their bodies, or it won’t last long;33 
2) simple mechanical where the thing causes abrasions; 3) intentional “that directly 
attributes goals and desires” to the thing; 4) artifactual where a human designed the 
thing; or finally, 5) no description at all.34 “Children at all ages thought that the ‘teleo-
logical’ thing did not know what it was doing any more than the mechanical one,” 
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Keil concludes—that is, a large majority of children did not attribute knowledge or 
intention to the “functional/teleological” thing.35 If the human propensity to ascribe 
intentional agency were as pervasively strong as CSR generally holds, one might expect 
that at least the youngest children would attribute such to the “functional/teleological” 
thing. After all, blaming evil spirits for disease is rather common among tribal peoples. 
While Kelemen has parenthetically referenced the Mead and Keil studies, she does not 
specify, let alone engage, Keil’s results, while only briefly engaging Mead’s study in a 
footnote.36
CSR also attempts to assert the decisiveness of unconscious mechanisms, which 
involve rather crude anthropomorphizing, by claiming that they override more abstract 
theologically correct conceptions in normal processing. That is, agency detection favors 
“minimally counterintuitive” rather than more maximal supernatural concepts. An 
experiment involved reading stories involving supernatural agents and then asking 
participants questions about said stories. My take is that the researchers were much 
too picky in holding their test subjects to the standard of a quite literal remembering 
or retelling of the story, rather than allowing the participants to go with the gist of the 
story, even allowing for employment of some metaphor, before judging that the partici-
pants really believed the anthropomorphic rather than theological ideas.
Magic, mentioned just above, represents another area where CSR appears narrow 
in its outlook. Most cognitive scientists of religion ignore magic. This neglect does 
limit human ability to find or form meaningful patterns in nature and human social life 
to only those practices in which individual supernatural agents are directly involved. 
James Frazer famously distinguished between magic and religion, consigning them 
to different eras of human prehistory. Scholars of religion since then have corrected 
Frazer in that both appear in indigenous religion and that some beliefs and practices 
combine both. Yet there seems to be little room for doubt that some ritual practices of 
indigenous peoples involve the belief that, if the ritual is performed correctly, a certain 
magical result will eventuate apart from the intentions of any supernatural agent. This 
absence of agency fails to fit into CSR’s paradigm.
This sole focus on personal agency figures into CSR’s inability to allow for any over-
all directionality or meaning to the universe. Edward Slingerland for his part dismisses 
the possibility of any larger meaning: Some modern Westerners harbor “a more diffuse, 
non-theistic sense that what we are doing ‘matters’—a conceit that makes no sense 
unless we project some sort of abstract, metaphorical agency onto the universe.”37 
Slingerland attributes this projection to the sphere of social interaction, specifically 
the human need for social approval. I would mention that our basic biological drive 
for orientation to our world involves both the social and physical—and perhaps in 
the human case orientation and explanation beyond our physical and social universes. 
Slingerland’s dismissal appears to apply not only to those with the vague sensibility he 
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cites, but many Eastern believers as well as some Western religious naturalists who see 
the universe or aspects of it as divine, as involving some non-theistic directionality. 
These folks do attribute precisely some metaphorical agency or causality to the universe 
or to the overarching (traditionally more Western) or underlying (more Eastern) source 
of the universe. That these Eastern believers and Western religious naturalists have 
deliberately rejected metaphors of personal agency for their version of ultimate real-
ity constitutes an argument against Slingerland’s assumption that our need for social 
approval must lie behind all belief in an ultimate or overall direction or meaning to 
the universe. The purported impossibility of any ultimate or overall meaning to the 
universe tends to leave us with subjectivism and nihilism.
While CSR for the most part adopts a reductive physicalist stance for itself, it tends 
to view the benighted populace of humanity as inveterately dualistic. The dualism it 
so attributes is quite Cartesian and disembodied. In so doing, it interprets religion 
in a discarnate way, thus reinscribing and reinforcing a discarnate dualism. To make 
sense of an indigenous shaman imagining he or she is flying in the body of an eagle, a 
shaman being possessed by the spirit of a mountain, or a modern movie goer follow-
ing the transfer of bodies and consciousnesses in Freaky Friday, cognitive scientists like 
Slingerland, Jesse Bering, and Paul Bloom, assume that the shaman or movie-goer must 
be a Cartesian philosopher who at some level is abstractly and logically explaining these 
strange happenings.38 This is to misunderstand our usual prereflective assumptions to 
the point of absurdity: we do not imagine ourselves in even a momentary disembod-
ied state before we take on a different body or spirit. The more reasonable alternative 
would be to recognize that we humans are embodied beings who naturally imagine in 
various bodily ways.
Despite CSR’s claim that our agency detection anthropomorphizes, some cogni-
tive scientists of religion claim that we humans over-detect disembodied gods, goddesses, 
and spirits. Primal and ancient animistic belief entailed embodiment in nature or in 
some kind of anthropomorphized—or animalized—body. Of course, these embodied 
spirits do not suffer all the limitations that humans and animals endure with their 
bodies. And their bodies may be hidden from us or even invisible to our ordinary 
vision. As some ancient religions developed, as in Greece, for example, some animistic 
beliefs gave way to a god or goddess who controlled a part of nature, like Poseidon and 
the seas. However, such ancient gods and goddesses were blatantly anthropomorphic in 
body. Not only did primal and ancient people typically depict deities as embodied, they 
believed their representations bore some analogy to actual divine bodies. While ancient 
Judaism prohibited representation of God (the historical reality of which happened 
much later than depicted in Hebrew biblical narrative), it did not explicitly deny, and 
in some scriptural passages specifically refers to, God’s body. The underlying rationale 
was that the greatness of God and the divine body in comparison to human or animal 
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bodies would countenance no visual representations. The complete disembodiment 
and immateriality of God in learned Jewish and Christian theology resulted from a 
long journey strongly influenced by Greek philosophy, particularly of the Platonic and 
Aristotelian varieties. (Even Stoicism, influential in the ancient world and in some 
respects on Judaism and Christianity, affirmed some materiality to the divine, in its 
pure state of Fire.) I would note that the argument of some cognitive scientists that 
our unconscious supernatural agency detection usually overcomes abstract theological 
thinking runs counter to the notion that religious or supernatural agency is essentially 
discarnate. The insistence of some cognitive scientists that belief in spiritual beings like 
us in various ways exist as essentially disembodied simply reinscribes the presupposed 
picture.
Also tending to reinscribe our essential disembodiment, cognitive scientists often 
regard belief in life after death as tantamount to a dualistic belief in disembodied spir-
its. Jesse Bering and David Bjorklund did an influential study on children’s beliefs 
about what happens to a mouse eaten by an alligator.39 Bering in a major article begins 
with this assertion: “By stating that psychological states survive death, one is commit-
ting to a radical form of mind-body dualism.”40 While I have written at some length 
about particulars of the Bering-Bjorklund study,41 my main criticism is that I suspect 
that young children typically believed that the mouse continued to exist in another 
body in another world. Unfortunately, that possibility was not tested for. Ten years ago 
at a reunion at Yale University, I asked Paul Bloom whether any of the experiments 
with children supported the hypothesis that humans innately distinguish between 
disembodied souls and mindless bodies over the hypothesis that humans innately 
distinguish between animate, sentient, intentional embodied beings and inanimate 
things. He answered in the negative. In an e-mail from 2008, he indicated that he 
finds more “compelling” the thesis of mind-body dualism for interpreting the results of 
the most significant experiment(s), by Bering and Bjorklund, than the animate-inan-
imate distinction. Specifically he writes that the fact that most young children believe 
that a dead mouse’s mental states continue while its biological states do not “strongly 
suggests that kids think it has no body but still has a mind.”42 As suggested above, the 
lack of testing the possibility that the children believe other bodily states continue in 
another realm makes dualism less than compelling for me. These cognitive scientists 
have begged the question of whether afterlife belief entails dualistic disembodiment.
Furthermore, this assumption about afterlife belief flies in the face of evidence 
from the history of religions. Primal religions typically believe in an embodied world 
in some spatial relation to our present one—though unreachable until we die—and 
often better than our present one, without all the evils. The clichéd “happy hunting 
ground” represents one version of this. Moreover, the spirits of ancestors as they inter-
act with this world, though without some of the limitations of our bodies, are hardly 
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disembodied. Early theorist of religion E. B. Tylor reports that primal cultures, though 
often conceiving spirits as “vaporous,” most definitely do not regard them as “immate-
rial.” In one example, he notes how some tribal religions make sure an opening exists in 
a container where a spirit abides so that it could escape.43 When the Toraja of Indonesia 
are about to sacrifice a water buffalo, they warn the spirits to keep away lest they suffer 
injury.44
 As ancient agricultural civilizations developed, afterlife beliefs typically changed: 
In some cases afterlife belief died out, in many others an unhappy picture of the after-
life emerged. I attribute this change to the dominance of agriculture in these cultures 
and to their controlling pictures about life that arise from agriculture: like dead plants, 
dead human bodies are buried in the earth. While new plants come from the soil and 
nourish new human life, particular human individuals do not revive from the grave 
any more than do particular individual plants. Typically, afterlife belief focuses on an 
Underworld, where people are mere shades or shadows of their former selves, as in the 
Hebrew concept of Sheol. Note that the dead do have a body, albeit a shadowy one. 
While they do not suffer complete disembodiment, I sense that the lack of full-blooded, 
full-bodied life constitutes precisely the most unsatisfactory aspect of existence in Sheol 
or Hades. The unhappy nature of such an afterlife takes some of the steam out of 
the argument for a human compulsion to believe that some (disembodied) part of us 
survives. Annihilation appears a better prospect than “life” after death in Sheol.
Additionally, I would note that resurrection of the body represents the most 
original version of life after death in the Western monotheisms of rabbinic Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. The influence of Greek philosophy, especially (neo)Platonism, 
has complicated the picture in Western theology, introducing a disembodied soul—at 
least until the Judgment Day—with which to contend. Nevertheless, I suspect that for 
believers in an afterlife from these religions, the vast majority imagine immediate pres-
ence in heaven with a perfect body, reunited with departed family and friends whose 
transformed bodies they immediately recognize. 
While Slingerland shares the official ontology of reductive physicalism with other 
cognitive scientists of religion, innate Cartesian dualism ends up playing a peculiar 
role in his attempt to make sense of life. Slingerland begins sounding rather Poteatian, 
poking fun at poststructuralist types who maintain that our preferences are constructed 
apart from the constraining influences of our bodies and then declaring that “the 
mind is the body, and the body is permeated through and through with mind.”45 
Nevertheless, he concludes that the fundamental nature of consciousness is the same as 
that of everything else in the universe—a configuration of matter and energy, just more 
complex than most: “human beings, like all of the other entities that we know about, 
appear to be robots all the way down, whether we like that idea or not.”46 But we do not 
like that idea! Here is where dualism re-enters in Slingerland’s account, in an ultimately 
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futile attempt to recover some sense of human personhood. Part of us wants to know 
the truth, however unpleasant (a part which I view as continuous with our prereflective 
bodily desire accurately to orient ourselves)—in this case, the alleged physicalist truth 
that we are just things.47 However, to quote Jack Nicholson’s character in A Few Good 
Men, another part of us “can’t handle the truth.” For evolution has designed us not to 
think of ourselves and others as mere things—even though we are.48 Or as he puts it in 
a subtitle, “We are robots designed not to believe that we are robots.”49 So not to worry, 
since evolution has programmed us to believe our subjectivity and our meanings are 
real and to act as if we were valuable. This dualistic thinking consigns us to irreconcil-
able conflict between supposed scientific and metaphysical truth on the one hand and 
what makes life meaningful on the other. The poignancy of this conflict comes out for 
me in an interview. Slingerland declares, “I love intensely” my six-year-old daughter. 
But then he confesses that this deep affection for his daughter is illogical, since he 
does not really believe in “love.”50 This is indeed insane dualistic thinking, where the 
embodied love of a parent for one’s child is less real, less true than discarnate alleged 
scientific truth. Of course, I credit Ted Slingerland with really loving his daughter at 
the deepest level of his being—and at the deepest level of reality, both in terms of truth 
and value, in spite of intellectual protestations to the contrary. I also credit him with 
making unusually explicit the implications of the dualistic, discarnate, and deracinate 
picture that affects us academicians and many others, that alienates us from ourselves 
as responsible persons, putting us in conflict with our lived, embodied, convivial mean-
ings, in the name of a perspective from nowhere that claims to be the perspective from 
everywhere. If, as suggested earlier, critical reflection must play a crucial role in under-
mining the power of this picture, then clear-cut examples of the absurdities that ensue 
when we follow this picture to its logical conclusions, and calling attention to those 
examples, should figure prominently in our attempt to fashion a cure.
To summarize, CSR in general adopts the reductive physicalist and scientistic 
side of a discarnate dualism, as it imagines it sees things with perfect objectivity. This 
position renders dubious any human meaning. In particular it reduces religion in the 
first instance to unconscious mechanisms that imagine the existence of supernatural 
agents. Belief in such agents supposedly helps explain the illusory belief in any larger 
meaning. Recognizing the human desire for meaning, many cognitive scientists of reli-
gion also attribute to people the belief in disembodied divine and human spirits, thus 
further serving to explain supposedly illusory meaning, including belief in an afterlife 
or in any larger meaning. These latter thinkers therefore conjure up and reinscribe 
an allegedly innate dualism from the subjectivistic or idealistic side. Thus, cognitive 
scientists of religion on the whole relegate humans to idealistic or physicalist disem-
bodiment, absconding from their own and disallowing others’ personal, responsible, 
convivial embodiment in our natural and social world and the inherent meaning of 
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that embodiment, as we tacitly rely on our prereflective bodies. They also abscond from 
their own and disallow others’ search for larger or religious meaning through reflection 
based on our prereflective embodiment in a meaningful world. 
Cognitive science of religion could be more productive if it applied the post-critical 
insights of Poteat in the following ways to bring out our radical, grounded, responsible, 
and full-fledged embodiment: 1) design studies of theological language and of reli-
gious ritual that a) attempt to discern how literally versus how metaphorically people 
understand theological and ritual language and b) attempt to understand how people 
integrate prereflective with more reflective belief and practice; and 2) design studies 
of afterlife belief and of hypothetical situations where people appear to switch bodies 
that allow for the acknowledgement of embodiment in such beliefs and imaginary 
situations. This would involve actually attempting to discern whether people imagine 
or think about being in a totally discarnate state, rather than assuming that disembodi-
ment is necessarily entailed in afterlife belief or in imagining being in another body.
What is Poteat’s legacy in a world where the insane picture he saw and the insane 
condition he diagnosed still exist and exert great influence? In responding to an earlier 
draft of this essay, Dale Cannon asked, “Who (or what) has been cured”? I would 
answer that Poteat was cured as have been many of his students—and students of those 
students (though, more than once in his books Poteat catches himself being influenced 
by the discarnate picture;51 and so I also catch myself in my own musings). Currently 
there appears to be no movement clearly countering this insane picture that has reached 
a level of general awareness among scholars of religion, let alone the wider academy 
community. Yet despite this lack and the various discarnating subjectivist and reduc-
tive physicalist influences in the academy mentioned above, reasons for tempered hope 
exist. Mark Johnson’s embodied philosophy of mind does seem to have reached a level of 
general awareness among philosophers, though how influential that perspective, along 
with related theories of embodied cognition, is amidst the philosophy community is 
questionable. And American pragmatism continues to offer resources given much of 
its basis in embodied experience. Related to embodied cognition, non-reductionism 
among biologists, philosophers of biology, cognitive psychologists, and neuroscientists 
open to holistic meaning within nature offers encouragement. Such thinkers include 
Terrence Deacon, Stuart Kaufmann, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, 
Antonio Damasio, and Gerald Edelman. Also, the February 2017, issue of Tradition 
and Discovery focuses on biosemiotics, which acknowledges meaning at all levels of life. 
None of these just-mentioned thinkers or movements has evidenced any awareness of 
Poteat’s relevant work—though hopefully that may change. In any case, because of the 
insight—and the hope—that Bill Poteat has given us, we need to keep that hope and 
keep the faith, combatting the insanity and helping people find sacred grounding in 
their bodies in our convivial natural and social world.
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